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Universally quantified statements exert an enormous attraction on 
language users. Their emotional force unfortunately clashes with 
the rather strict requirements on their truth. Small wonder then that 
there is a class of expressions used to reduce their force. These 
expressions typically diminish the domain quantified over. The 
exceptive constructions studied in this paper are prime examples. I 
will concentrate on the two types illustrated in (1), the highly 
grammaticized English but-phrase in (1a), and the 'free exceptive' 
with ezcept for in (1b). 
(1) a .  Every student but John attended the meeting. 
b. Except for John, every student attended the meeting. 
This paper has two concerns, a narrowly descriptive one and a 
broader and potentially more interesting theoretical one. Although 
exceptive constructions and some of their core properties have been 
known since the times of the medieval semanticists, their proper 
analysis in a formal theory has proven very elusive. 1 The analysis 
proposed in this paper will hopefully at least be more adequate than 
earlier attempts. 
·Some of the material in this paper was presented at the Conference on Cross­
Linguistic Quantification at the LSA Summer Institute in Tucson, Arizona, July 
22, 1989, at WCCFL X in Tempe, Arizona, March 1991, and at "Semantics and 
Linguistic Theory 1", Comell Univenity, Ithaca, New York, April 1991. For 
comments and suggestions, I would like to thank especially AngeJika Kratzer, 
Barbara Partee, Roger Higgins, Hotze Rullmann, Ginny Brennan, Paul Portner, 
Ed Keenan, Joe Moore, and Sue Tunstall Research on this paper haa been partially 
supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. BNS 87-19999 
(Principal lnveatigators: Emmon Bach, Angelika Kratzer, and Barbara Partee). 
No one but myself should be blamed for the remaining mistakes and errors. 
lModern references include: Keenan " Stavi (1986), Hoeksema (1987, 1990), 
Landman " Moerdi,ik (1979), Reinhart (1989). 
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The broader concern of this paper, however, has to do with the 
notion of degrees of grammaticization and whether it can be captured 
in a compositional theory of the interaction between syntax and 
semantics. If the difference between the lexical items but and except 
for is only reconstructable by associating different kinds of lexical 
stipulations with them, this would be a disappointing result. A 
reduction to more general principles, on the other hand, would be a 
success. I will show that assuming something like Chierchia's 
three-layers hypothesis (1984), it can be derived that the free type of 
exceptive is less strong than the NP-internal type. 
In Section 1 of this paper, I propose a semantic analysis of 
English but-phrases as in (2). 
(2) a.  Every student but John attended the meeting. 
b. No student but John attended the meeting. 
There is a problem of compositionality here: we would like to be able 
to give but a unified meaning that is applicable to both the positive 
determiner every and the negative one no . I show that it is indeed 
possible to give such a unified semantics, which turns out to have the 
added advantage of automatically explaining the co-occurrence 
restrictions of but-phrases. An interesting side-effect of the solution 
is that a previously unknown formal property is singled out that 
every and no share to the exclusion of all other basic determiners. 
In Section 2, ways of connecting the semantics to the syntax are 
considered. The semantics of Section 1 puts certain constraints on 
possible syntactic analyses. I will argue for an NP-intemal syntax of 
but-phrases and discuss two possible constituencies which merely 
correspond to different 'curryings' of the semantics. 
Section 3 then is devoted to the analysis offree exceptives, 
especially those formed with except for as in (3). 
(3) Except for the usual dissenters, most members didn't object. 
There are at least two intriguing problems raised by this type of 
exceptive. How are free roaming exceptives associated with their 
target quantifier? I will side with Reinhart (1989) who argues that 
quantifier raising (QR) brings about the rendez-vous of free exceptive 
and target quantifier. The compositionality problem remains: how do 
exceptive and target combine after the association is established? I 
will suggest that the adjunct exceptive gets inside the target by bind­
ing a context set variable. The lower degree of grammaticization of 
free exceptives will be traced back to restrictions on the possible 
logical type of such free variables. 
1. A Semantics for 'Sut'·Phrases 
1.1 What Do 'Sut'·Phrases Mean? 
Considering the paradigm sentences with but in (2), repeated here, 
their truth-conditions are intutively rather obvious. In (2a), John is 
the only student who did not attend the meeting. In (2b), John is the 
only student who did attend the meeting. The sentences, if true, cor­
respond to the diagrams in (4). 
(2) a .  Every student but John attended the meeting. 
b. No student but John attended the meeting. 
(4) (2a) (2b) 
Students Attenders Students Attenders 
<[Q) CN� 
In trying to derive the truth-conditions of but-sentences composition­
ally, we would like the determiners every and no to have their usual 
denotation creating the generalized quantifiers given in (5).2 
(5) [every]([ student] ) = (P � E I li n  [ student] = 0) 
[no]([student]) =  (P � E I  P n  [ student] = 0) 
We need to find a denotation [but] that together with the determiner 
meanings in (5) derives the meanings given in (6) for the whole NP.3 
(6) [every student but John] = {P � E I Ii n [ student]= {[John]}  } 
[no student but John] = (P � E I P n [ student] = {[John]}  ) 
2The principal references on generalized quantifiers are Barwise " Cooper (1981) 
and Keenan " Stavi (1986). Throughout this paper, I will employ the notational 
framework of Barwise " Cooper instead of Keenan's Boolean semantics or the 
lambda-expressions of Montague semantics. Everything here should be straight­
forwardly translatable into the other frameworks. [ every ] is defined in (5) in a 
way dift"erent from but equivalent to the standard formnlation ([student] c;:: P); the 
definition given here has the advantage of making the fundamental similarity 
between every and 110 more obvious. 
30rbe meanings in (6) are exactly those given by Keenan " Stavi (1986) in their 
brief mention of exceptives. They do not however attempt a compositional 
derivation, which is my main concem here. 
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The meanings in (6) are the result we want because they are equiva­
lent to the intuitive meaning given for (1)  above. What does [but] 
have to be for us to get the results in (6)? We especially want to have a 
unified meaning for but that can combine with both every and no 
without sneaking in a disjunctive stipulation. In the following 
sections, I will go through three successively stronger analyses that 
ultimately cuJminate in such an adequate semantics for but. 
1.2 'But' as a Minus Sign: Domain Subtraction 
The intuition which I will found my treatment of exceptives on is that 
they subtract entities from the domain of a quantifier. In a first 
approximation then, we could treat but as creating a noun modifier 
with a semantics as in (7). Some discussion of such an analysis can 
be found in Hoeksema (1987). 
(7) [ students but John] = [students] - {[John]}  
Our test sentence (2a) would then be true iff everyone who is  a student 
but who isn't John attended the meeting. While I do think that 
domain subtraction as in (7) is the central part of the meaning of 
exceptive, as a semantics for but it fails on two grounds. 
First, it fails to capture the co-occurrence restrictions of 
but-phrases . If but is a mere minus sign then the resulting set will be 
just like any other set without any distinguishing properties. The set 
of students minus John is a maximaUy dull set as far as set theory is 
concerned. There would then be no reason why some or most should 
not combine with it to form a well-formed noun phrase. But, *some 
students but John and *most students but John are clearly ill­
formed. 
Secondly, analyzing but as a minus sign allows some inferences 
to go through that are plainly illicit. The reason for this is that the 
universal determiners every and no are left downward monotone on 
their first argument as defined in (B). 
(B) Left Downward Monotonicity (,/.mOn) 4 
P e  D (A) and B � A � P e  D (B). 
This property of universal determiners is what makes the inferences 
in (9) valid. 
(9) Every human being is mortal. 
Every male human being is mortal. 
4Barwiae &: Cooper (1981) use the term 'anti-persistent'. 
No human being is mortal. 
=> No male human being is mortal. 
If we put the left downward monotonicity of the universal determin­
ers together with the view that but is a mere minus sign we now 
predict the inferences in (10) to be valid without further assumptions. 
The reason is that the set of students minus John and Jill is of course 
a subset of the set of students just minus John. Hence we should be 
able to infer down from the latter to the former. 
(10) Every student but John attended the meeting. 
1=>1 Every student but John and Jill attended the meeting. 
No student but John attended the meeting. 
1=>1 No student but John and Jill attended the meeting. 
But the inferences in (10) are blatantly incorrect. The conclusions 
imply that Jill is a student who did or did not attend the meeting. But 
that is something which we cannot validly infer from the premise. A 
satisfactory treatment of but then has to make sure that the down­
ward monotonicity of the universal determiners is blocked in some 
way to prevent the inferences in (10) from falsely going through. 
These problems notwithstanding, I would like to maintain the 
initial intuition as far as possible. I will assume that the central part 
of the meaning of but is indeed set subtraction. The strategy I pursue 
will be to add enough further conditions to the right hand side of the 
implication arrow in (11) to make it an equivalence.5 
(11) D A [but] C P = True => P e D (A-C) 
Key for (11): D = [every:n ,[no) 
A = [student] 
C = {[John]}  
P = [ attended the meeting] 
At this point, I will not as yet commit myself to a particular bracket­
ing of the noun phrase. Its internal constituency, the question of 
where the exceptive exactly operates, is the topic of Section 2. 
5For the semantics developed here to work, the NP after but has to introduce a set 
that can be subtracted from the set denoted by the head noun. This is arguably a 
healthy consequence because it appears that only NPs that can denote sets can 
appear after but; witness the ill-formedness of ·4l1 the students but each foreigner. 
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1.3 The Uniqueness Condition 
We have to strengthen the conditions even further. What does it 
mean to be the set of exception to a quantified statement? My answer 
is given in (12). 
(12) The set of exceptions to a quantified sentence D (A) P is the 
smallest set C such that D (A-C) P is true. 
The exception set C has to be the smallest set such that ifit is sub­
tracted from the quantifier domain the quantification comes out true. 
This can be factored out into two conditions, one of which is the 
domain subtraction clause we already know, and the other is essen­
tially a condition of uniqueness. The formulation in (13) contains 
three equivalent ways of conceiving of the uniqueness condition. 
(13) D A [but] C P = True 
¢:> P e D (A-C) & 'VY (P e D (A-Y) => C � Y). 
¢:> P e D (A-C) & 'VB (B !:: A & P e D (B) => cnS = 0) 
¢:> P e  D (A-C) & r. {y I P e  D (A-Y) } = C 
1t 1t 
Domain Uniqueness Condition 
Subtraction 
Consider again the paradigm sentence (la) and the illustration of the 
state of affairs described by it, repeated here in (14). (13) then says 
that (la) will be true iff everyone who is a student but who isn't John 
attended the meeting and it is the case that all the subsets of the 
students that contain only attenders do not contain John (that is a 
paraphrase of the second formulation of uniqueness). Note that this 
corresponds faithfully to the picture in (14). What the uniqueness 
condition boils down to then is that a but-phrase names the set 
responsible for the falsehood of the modified quantification. 
(14) Students Attenders 
� 
It should be obvious that the uniqueness condition is pragmatically 
natural. It ensures maximal relevance of the but-phrase: the excep­
tive not only is necessary to save the quantification, it also is the most 
economic way of doing that. The lexical meaning of but then has, I 
claim, internalized this pragmatically natural condition. 
Given the semantics for but in ( 13), the truth-conditions for 
exceptive sentences can be calculated as illustrated in (15). Apart 
from the application of the assumed standard definitions of [every] 
and [no] , aU the steps in these derivations are justified by fairly 
elementary set-theoretic equivalences.6 The resulting truth-condi­
tions are exactly the ones that we set out to obtain. So far then, (13) is 
what we wanted. The test sentences get their desired meaning: (la) is 
true iff John is the only student who did not attend the meeting, (lb) 
is true iff he is the only student who did attend the meeting. 
(15) [every] A [but] C P = True 
c::::> P e [every] (A-C) & \fY (P e [every] (A-Y) � C s; Y) 
c::::> (A-C) s; P & \fY «A-Y) s; p � C s; Y) 
c::::> P n A s; C & \fY ( P n A s; Y � C s; Y)  
c::::> P n A s; C & C s; P n A  
c::::> P n A = C  
[ no ]  A [but] C P = True 
c::::> P e [no] (A-C) & \fY (P e [no ]  (A-Y) � C s; Y) 
c::::> P n (A-C) = (2) & \fY (P n (A-Y) = (2) � C s; Y) 
c::::> P n A s; C & VY ( P n A � Y � C s; Y) 
c::::> P n A s; C & C s; P n A  
c::::> P n A = C  
It is also easy to show that the unwanted inferences discussed earlier 
do not go through anymore. Consider the sentences in (16). 
Assuming that (16a) is true, we can easily see that the semantics in 
(13) predicts that (16b) cannot be true at the same time. For if (16b) 
were true then all the sets of attending students would contain 
neither John nor Jill. But (16a) asserts that the set of students minus 
just John is a set of attenders, but it does contain Jill, in contradiction 
to (16b). The inference is therefore blocked. 
(16) a.  Every student but John attended the meeting. 
b. Every student but John and Jill attended the meeting. 
To complete the demonstration that ( 13) is a successful semantics for 
but, it has to be shown that the co-occurrence restrictions are suc-
&rbe set-theoretic tautologies employed are: 
( i )  X-Y c::; Z c:t X n Z  c::; Y 
(ii)  vy ( x c::; y ... Z c::; y) c:t Z c::; X 
(iii) X c::; Y & Y c::;X c:t X = Y  
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cessfully captured. The crucial observation is that among simple 
natural determiners the existence of a unique exception set is only 
guaranteed by the universal ones, e.g., all (and its synonyms) and no 
(and its synonyms). 
One direction is fairly elementary: if you have a universal deter­
miner and it turns out that P E D (A), then the unique exception is 
easy to obtain. If D  is no, then P n A is the culprit, it should have been 
empty bu!. wasn't; it is the unique exception we are looking for. If D  is 
all, then P n A is the offender and the unique exception, it should 
have been empty. 
As an example of a determiner that is not universal and does not 
give rise to unique exceptions let us examjne most. Consider the 
situation illustrated in (18) where (17a) is false because there a three 
students (Tom, John, and Harry) who did not attend the meeting 
while only two students (Bill and Mary) attended. 
(17) a. Most students attended the meeting. 
b. *Most students but Tom and John attended the meeting. 
(18) Attenders 
@g 
We could try to make the most-quantification true by excluding a suf­
ficient number of non-attending students from the set we are quanti­
fying over. So, we attempt (17b), excluding Tom and John, thus creat­
ing a situation where still only two students attended (Bill and Mary) 
bl,lt only one non-attender (Harry) remains. So now a majority of the 
students under consideration did attend the meeting. But note that 
since the most-claim is not a universal one we did not have to exclude 
all non-attending students. Hence we had a choice of which students 
to exclude. We could equally as well have excluded Tom and Harry or 
John and Harry. There is then obviously no unique set of students 
that we have to exclude. The uniqueness condition encoded in (13) 
brandmarks (17b) as false, since Tom and John are not the unique 
exception set to the quantification in (17a). Parallel thought experi­
ments can be carried out for all determiners that even stand a chance 
of having exceptions (recall that the upward monotone ones are 
excluded by even more elementary considerations). 
It has to be noticed that there are limiting cases where even a 
most-quantification has a unique exception. If there were only two 
students John and Harry and only one of them, Harry, attended the 
meeting, we can make the statement Most students atte1'l.ti£d the 
meeting true by excepting the unique student who did not attend the 
meeting: John. The existence of such exotic situations is obviously 
not enough for but to be able to occur with most. 
The analysis of the co-occurrence restrictions of but that I propose 
then is that they are a grammaticization of the semantic fact that 
only universal determiners guarantee the existence of a unique 
exception set. In some way this will have to be built into the lexical 
entry for but. This concludes the demonstration that (13) is an 
adequate specification of the meaning of exceptive but. I have shown 
that (13) predicts the correct truth-conditions, that unwarranted 
inferences induced by the monotonicity of universal determiners are 
blocked, and that the co-occurrence restrictions of but are straight­
forwardly explained. 
2. The Syntax of'But'·Phrases 
So far I have been careful not to commit myself to a position of how 
exactly the elements in a noun phrase like every student but John 
combine semantically and how this is linked to a particular syntactic 
structure. This section is devoted to these issues. 
2.1 The NP·1nterDal Operator 'But' 
A close look at the semantics in (13), repeated here in one of its 
formulations, reveals that the but-phrase must have access to both 
the determiner D and its domain A. D is applied more than once in 
(19) to dift'erent sets, and A is subtracted from at various points. 
(19) D A (but] C P = True 
� P e D (A-C) & VY (P e D (A-Y) � C !; Y). 
The necessity of 'simultaneous access' then excludes two initially 
attractive implementations. It is first not possible to have the excep­
tive operate solely on the domain A, which would have made it possi­
ble to treat it as a fairly ordinary common noun modifier. It is also 
not possible to compute the noun-phrase denotation D (A) first and 
have the exceptive then take the result as its argument, which would 
have corresponded to an analysis of but-phrases as NP modifiers. 
The semantics in (19) forces more exotic analyses. 
Assuming binary branching in both syntax and semantics, we 
have to decide whether the but-phrase applies first to the determiner 
and then to the common noun or the other way round. That is, we 
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have to decide between two different 'curryings'7 of the function 
denoted by the but-phrase, given in (20).8 
(20) a.  NP 
«e,b,t> 
Det 
~ 
Det but X 
« e,t>,« e,t>,t» « <e,t>,« e,b,t» ,« e,b,<<e,b,b» 
b. NP 
«e,b,t> 
� 
Det N 
« e,b,« e,t>,t» « <e,b,« e,b,b>,<<e,b,b> 
� 
N but X 
N 
<e,b 
<e,b « e,t>,« <e,b,<<e,b,b>,<<e,b,b» 
The first possibility is to treat but-phrases as modifiers of determiners 
which make them be of the same type as adverbs like almost in 
almost all (namely, functions from determiner denotations to deter­
miner deenotations). This is actually implicit in an earlier proposal 
by Keenan & Stavi (1986) who, however, do not give any compositional 
derivation but treat every . . •  but . • •  and M . • •  but • • •  as complex lexical 
items instead. Syntactically this would force us to accept either a 
discontinuous constituency or a local movement around the head 
noun.9 Treating but-phrases as modifiers of determiners may 
70r rather 'sch6nfinkelizations', ef. Sch6nfinkel (1924). 
8 Adopting the DP-hypothesis would of course mutliply the possible structures even 
more. At the moment I do not see any strong arguments for any particular 
structure. 
9Such local wrappings are presumably independently motivated by constructions 
like an euy rug to ckan or tIN first pereon we ttJlked to (Ed Keenan, pc). For 
references on the status of discontinuity in the theory of grammar see the 
provide a natural connection to constructions like all but at most five 
students where we find a complex determiner phrase built with but 
to the left of the head noun. 
The second and semantically more adventurous option has the 
but-phrase combine with the common noun first to give a higher type 
common noun which then takes the determiner as its argument, in a 
reversal of the ususal function-argument structure. This high type 
for common nouns is not usually employed in semantic analyses and 
we would like independent evidence for it. 10 
It seems to me very difficult to decide between these options and in 
the absence of decisive evidence I will not commit myself to one of 
them in particular. It may even be that the data unclerdetermine the 
choice of structure, which would mean that there are two nearly 
equivalent grammars for this phenomenon. 
What is cru.cial for the main argument of this paper is that the 
but-phrase, because of the built-in uniqueness condition, has to have 
a rather high logical type. In Section 3.4, I will suggest that this 
distinguishes them from the less grammaticized free exceptives. 
3. Free EzceptiNi 
Can the notion of degrees of grammaticization be reconstrued in a 
formal theory of grammar? That will be the focus of this section, in 
which I tum to the analysis of free exceptives with except for. The 
next subsections will establish that free exceptives are in some sense 
a less grammaticized cousin of but-phrases which at some point in 
their history presumably got 'subducted' from the status of an 
adjunct to the status of a logical operator inside the noun phrase. The 
main claim will be that the differences between the two types of 
exceptives follow from the fact that free exceptives have a lower logi­
cal type than the high one of but-phrases. 
contributions in Huck .. Ojeda (1981) and Jim Blevina' diuertation (1990). See 
also Bach's (1979, 1981) Right Wrap operation which is one of the influences on the 
HPSG framework. 
100rbere is one place in the literature I am aware of where this type is diac:uaaed. 
Partee .. Booth (1983: 374ft) cite a manuac:ript by Robin Cooper where he proposes to 
analyze the reading of (0 where it means "moat men swim and moat women swim­
by raising the type of the common noun phrase. 
( i )  Most men and women swim. 
Partee .. Booth diSCUBII some of the issues that arise from admitting such 
type-raising. 
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3.1 'Ezcept for' 
What I call free exceptives are phrases marked with e:ccept (or, 
which can appear both in left- and right-peripheral positions. 
(21) a. Except for the famous detective, no one suspected the cook. 
b. No one suspected the cook, except for the famous detective. 
This positional freedom makes free exceptives crucially different 
from but-phrases. I will assume without much argument that it is 
not possible to consider free exceptives as being related to their asso­
ciate quantifier by an s-structure movement rule. This is in accord 
with Baltin (1985) who argues that modifiers cannot in general be 
extraposed to the left. Suppose then that free exceptives are base­
generated as sentence adjuncts. 
There are, I think, three degrees of semantic integration of the 
free exceptive into the sentence they modify. The loosest connection is 
found in cases where the exceptive is an afterthought, repair, or self­
correction, illustrated by (22). It seems unlikely that these are 
amenable to a compositional analysis. I will leave them aside. 
(22) Everyone loved the new show and noone thought it would be 
cancelled so soon. Except for George, of course. 
An intriguing, perhaps best termed 'appositive', use is shown in (23). 
If near-universal determiners like most or few are employed, this 
probably gives rise to an implicature that it was not possible to use a 
universal determiner. In other words, they implicate the existence of 
an exception set. The sentences in (23) seem to have as their most 
prominent reading one where the exceptive gives further information 
about the exception set. (23a) then would convey that Joan is a notable 
exception to the generalization that cabinet members liked the 
proposal. It seems obvious that this appositive reading should only 
arise with free exceptives. They can, so to speak, 'wait' until the 
implicatures of the sentence are computed. 
(23) a. Except for Joan, most cabinet members liked the proposal. 
b. Except for John, few employees openly opposed the pay cut. 
The third use of free exceptives, which is most similar to 
but-phrases, is the one I want to concentrate on here. In (24) the 
exceptive is used 'restrictively': only after the exceptive has done its 
thing will the quantification come out true. 
(24) a.  Except for Jim, noone really liked the soup. 
b. Except for Jane, my relatives are (all) total bores. 
c .  Except for the assistant professors, most faculty members 
supported the dean. 
The account I will argue for again gives the exceptive a semantics of 
Domain Subtraction. The exceptive then has to 'get inside' the NP, 
which I show can be achieved via binding of a context set variable. 
Following work by Chierchia (1984), I will propose that such a vari­
able can only be of type <e,t>. As a consequence then, free exceptives 
will have a logically weaker semantics than but-phrases and can 
therefore also appear with non-universal determiners as (24c) shows. 
3.2 Reinhart (1989): Free Esceptives aDd QR 
Reinhart (1989) proposes that the association between free exceptive 
and target quantifier is established by quantifier raising (QR). The 
best evidence for this comes from examples where s-structure 
movement is routinely ruled out whereas QR is acknowledged to be 
possible. One such case is demonstrated in (25).11 
(25) a. *Which cityi does [somebody from tjl despise it? 
b. Somebody from every city despises it. 
c .  Except for London, somebody from every city despises it. 
d.  *Somebody from every city despises it but London. 
It was May (1977, 1985) who presented 'inverse linking' examples like 
(25b) to show that QR is freer than overt wh-movement which cannot 
extract from a complex subject as in (25a). (25c) shows that a free 
exceptive can associate with a quantifier inside a complex subject. As 
a tidbit and another argument for an s-structure extraposition 
movement for but-phrases, (25d) clearly shows that the limited possi-
11The discussion here is very much in the spirit of Reinhart's discussion. 
However, her own example (i) fails to make the point. 
( i )  Jokes about everyone were told except Felix. 
The biggest problem with (i) is that it sounds ungrammatical to most native 
speakers. Note that the underlying sentence itself, i.e. (iia), seems degraded, 
perhaps because extraposition of the PP as in (iib) is strongly preferred. 
(ii) a .  .1 Jokes about everyone were told. 
b. Jokes were told about everyone. 
Furthermore, most of her examples have a right-peripheral exceptive formed with 
bare ezcept (without for) and some of these do not sound as good as she claims. 
E:ccept is perhaps more h"ke but than she realizes (she actually does not discuss any 
dift'erences between types of exceptives). To make sure that utraposition does not 
play a role, I use left-peripheral ucept for-phrases in my examples. 
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bility of having but-phrases sentence-finally is subject to much 
stronger constraints than free exceptives. 
Reinhart (1989) DOW proposes that after QR has applied to the 
associate of a free exceptive, the resulting configuration is in fact 
sufficient to allow the semantic rules to operate successfully. 
Depending on certain theoretical decisions that do not have to 
concem us here, we can give a sentence like (26&) one of the LF 
representations in (26b). 
(26) a.  Except for John, every student left. 
b. 
or 
NP� 
every student � 
except for John IleftP 
tl 
~ 
NP2 
IP � tl left 
NPI � every student /' � 
CONJ NP 
except for John 
The choice between the two LFs in (26b) depends on whether in the 
second version the raised quantifier will be able to antecedent-govem 
its trace. Reinhart suggest that in an adjunction structure like this 
the antecendent-government definition may be fulfilled. She has to 
give the exceptive a very dubious structure, though, treating e:u:ept 
for as a conjunction. We may then prefer the first version as less 
theoretically dicey. 
As Reinhart herself realizes, even after the LFs in (26) have been 
created, it still remajns unclear how they are interpreted correctly. 
First, the NP every student on its own is of course not the correct 
semantic binder of its trace. It seems obvious that it has to be the LF­
created constituent every student except for John that binds the 
argument trace in the IP. This problem will probably take care of 
itself once we have solved the second problem: how does the exceptive 
get to operate inside the associate quantifier although we only have 
an adjunction structure? 
3.3 Tricks of the Be1atiw Clause Trade 
Let us suppose that we cannot touch the structural integrity of the 
associate quantifier, that is, that we cannot blow it up and reassem­
ble the pieces as we need them. In some ways, this situation is remi­
niscent of the long standing debate about the constituency of relative 
clauses. 12 Here, semantic arguments favour an N-modifier analysis, 
while there are other considerations that support an NP-modifier 
analysis. The last word about this recently rather dormant issue has 
presumably not been spoken. The study of exceptives can probably 
profit from some of the precedents set in the realm of relative clauses. 
Robin Cooper in his dissertation (1975) proposed a way of inter­
preting correlative clauses (Hittite was his particular data source) 
that made them common noun modifiers semantically despite their 
fairly indisputable S-adjunct status. Bach and Cooper (1978)13 showed 
that this solution could also be used to reconcile an NP-Ievel syntax of 
English relative clauses with an N-semantics.14 The crucial tech­
nique is the introduction of a free variable at the N-Ievel which can 
then later be filled in by the relative clause. In informal notation, the 
NP with relative clause in (27a) will be interpreted as in (27b). 
(27) a.  [ [every man] who loves Mary] 
b. AR [ [every) ([ man] n R) ] ([loves Mary] ) 
c=> ( every) ([man) n [loves Mary) 
Non-trivial questions about the restrictiveness of the resulting 
framework arise then.15 What is the status of the NP-internal free 
variable posited here? One way of conceiving of the status of such free 
variables is that they are something like miraculously 
base-generated traces of base-generated adjuncts; base-generation 
would have to be less constrained than actual movement traces. For 
Hindi correlative clauses, Srivastav (1990) presents an alternative 
where what the correlative clause binds in its associate is not a free 
12A partial list of ref'erences should include at least: Stockwell, Schachter &; Partee 
(1973: Chapter 7 on 'Relativization') and their list of earlier references, Partee 
(1973, 1975), Chomsky (1975), McCawley (1981). Further references will be 
mentioned below. 
13This article is an elaboration of Appendix A of Cooper's dissertation. 
14An application to German relative clauses is given in von Stechow (1979). 
15some diacuaaion can be found in Janaaen (1983) and Partee (l984). 
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variable ex nihilo but is in fact created by the demonstrative deter­
miner of the NP . 16 I favor a third possibility which was actually 
briefly put forward by Cooper himself (1975: 258f). When the free vari­
able inside the noun phrase is not bound offby a relative clause, he 
suggests, it may represent the contextual restriction of the NP-inter­
pretation to a specific restricted set of entities.17 The need for such 
restrictions has been discussed in some recent work on generalized 
quantifiers (Westerstahl 1985, Johnsen 1987) and can be traced all the 
way back to early contributions to logical theory by Wallis, Boole, and 
de Morgan. 
3.4 BindingR 
I would now like to urge that the analysis of free exceptives should be 
the one informally represented in (28). 
(28) a. bp [every student]i [IP [except for John] bP q left ]]] 
b. AR ( [every] ([student] n R) [except for John] )  ( [left] ) 
� [every] ([man] n (j) ) [left] 
� [man ] - {jJ c; [left] . 
A free variable R of type <e,t> is introduced into the translation which 
is COJ\ioined with the denotation of the common noun. The associate 
quantifier adjoins to the same IP that the free exceptive is a base­
generated adjunct of. Following Reinhart's idea the two phrases can 
then be interpreted as if they were sisters. The free exceptive gets 
quantified into the free variable R inside the quantifier. The semantic 
effect is that of set subtraction. 
Three obvious problems should immediately be addressed: (i) Why 
is this approach not also adequate for but-phrases? (ii) Does this 
approach explain why the co-occurrence restrictions of free excep­
tives are less rigid than those of but-phrases? and (iii) Why do 
sentences with universal determiners and free exceptives seem to 
have the same meaning as the corresponding sentences with but if 
all free exceptives do is set subtraction? 
The important ingredient in answering all these questions is a 
restriction on the logical type of the context set variable. The particu-
161 hope to be able to dillC1Ul SriY81tav'1 analysil and a pouible different treatment 
BOIDe other time. 
17Cooper refers to a similar luggestion made by Vend1er (1967) who used an 
1lDUJ)ftIaed relative clause to introduce the imp1ict reatrictionl on definitel. 
Another early reference il HaUller'I dilsertation (1974). 
lar formulation I adopt comes from work by Gennaro Chierchia. 18 In 
his dissertation (1984: 74-90) he has some thoughts about the status of 
the hierarchy of logical types. There are, Chierchia says, basically 
three levels of natural language meanings: entities, properties, and 
functors. The third layer, the level of functors, is the exotic one. He 
proposes that there can be no variables of a functor type as formu­
lated in (29).19 
(29) The MNo Functor Anapbora Constraint- CChierchia 1984) 
Functors do not enter anaphoric processes in natural 
languages. 
Among the consequences of this constraint are the absence of 
wh-questions for determiners, non-predicative adverbs like almost, 
and other previously mysterious properties of natural language. For 
our context set variable the constraint will ensure that it can only be a 
set variable of type <e,t>. Remember that the uniqueness condition 
grammaticized in the lexical meaning of but forced us in Section 2 to 
give the but-phrase a functor type rather higher than <e,t>. The 
consequence of adopting (29) then is that an exceptive can only have 
the uniqueness condition as part of its lexical meaning if it is base­
generated in an NP-internal position. Free exceptives which get 
inside via binding of a variable cannot have the uniqueness condition 
as part of their lexical meaning. Since it was the uniqueness condi­
tion that explained the strict co-occurrence restrictions of but­
phrases, it is no surprise that free exceptives have looser restrictions 
and can indeed occur with non-universal determiners. 
The weakness of the lexical meaning of free exceptives does not 
preclude that there are pragmatic strengthenings of that meaning. 
With universal determiners, the maxima1Jy relevant reading will 
IBcbierchia's ideas are inspired by Jespersen's hierarchy of primaries, 
aecondariea, and tertiaries (1924: Chapter VII). I am very grateful to Paul Portner 
for reminding me of Chierebia's dilCllaaion. 
190rhe use of a free variable to stand in for the choice between a number of sentential 
CODaectiva meaninp (bec:auae, in apite 0(, • • •  ) by Stump (1981, 1986) in his treatment 
of the interpretation of free absolutes and adjuncts might be a countereumple. I 
auapect though that his use of a free variable is rather clift"erent from the one 
diacuuecl in this paper. His variable is not subject to wh-movement, anaphora, or 
bincIiDc. Still, this whole area needs a lot of further attention. For lOme comments 
on Stump's analysis see Partee (1984). Anplika Kratzer (PC) points out two further 
potential problems: only seems to be able to auociate with foc:usaecl determiners or 
fOClllsed bound variable pronoun .. and functional questions (cf. Elisabeth 
Engdahl's work) seem to wla-move functon. At this point, I have no thoughts on 
these. 
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still be the one where the exception stated is  the unique smallest one. 
The perceived equivalence of universal statements modified by 
but-phrases or free exceptives then merely conceals the different way 
these readings come about. 
CouclusiOD 
The differences between the highly grammaticized but-phrases on 
the one hand and the somewhat looser free exceptives are then 
reconstructed as follows in my account. 
Free exceptives are sentence adjuncts. Under their restrictive 
reading, they bind the context set variable in their intended target, 
which has been quantifier-raised to a position that makes it a sister of 
the exceptive. Since this is an anaphoric process, the type of the oper­
ation these exceptives denote can not be higher than <e,t>. Domain 
Subtraction is then all they can lexically mean. Depending on the 
quantificational force of the target, the meaning may be pragmati­
cally strengthened to implicate uniqueness or mjnimaljty of the 
exception. 
But-phrases are NP-internal operators. As such they are not 
subject to the constraint in (29). They incorporate the uniqueness 
condition into their lexical meaning, hence they are ungrammatical 
with non-universal associates. It is rather pleasant to speculate that 
but-phrases at some point may have been free exceptives just like 
e:u:ept (or-phrases are today. The process of grammaticization then 
would have sucked them down into the noun phrase (a generally 
active process in the history of languages that Roger Higgins has 
termed ·subduction'). Concomitantly to becoming an NP-internal 
operator, it could have acquired a stronger meaning incorporating 
the uniqueness condition. At this point, this is mere speculation, 
although I strongly suspect that something like this has to be what 
happened. 
Let me conclude by saying that even if the specific decisions made 
in this paper tum out to be mistaken, the following four points might 
survive. (i) The study of exceptives and in general domain restrictors 
on quantifiers can serve as a probe into quantificational structures. 
(ii) Careful investigation of the techniques available to describe opera­
tors "from the outside" is still needed. (iii) Constraints such as the 
MNo Functor Anaphora Constraint" of Chierchia deserve further 
attention. (iv) A formal reconstruction of the notion of grammaticiza­
tion may not be impossible. 
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